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INTRODUCTION
Economic sanctions are the "weapon of choice"' in American for-
eign policy today. Sanctions do not require military force and, there-
fore, allow lawmakers to display their outrage and take decisive ac-
tion through relatively peaceful means.2 Historically, American
sanctions primarily have involved prohibitions on domestic compa-
nies from conducting business with a targeted country to coerce the
target into changing its illicit behavior. In the last year and a half,
however, the United States Congress has initiated sanctions with a
twist.
The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (" ILSA")3 empowers
the President with the authority to punish foreign companies that in-
vest in or trade with Iran or Libya, two nations the United States be-
lieves are sponsors of terrorism and acquirers of weapons of mass
destruction.4 Upon signing ILSA into law, President Clinton chal-
lenged all other nations to recognize the sinister nature of the two re-
gimes and understand that although Iran and Libya might provide
profitable business ventures in the short term, they are committed to
destruction in the long term.5 The United States issued an ultimatum
1. See Gary G. Yerkey, United States Sanctions Against Other Countries Cost
Exporters Up to $19 Billion, Study Says, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 736 (Apr.
23, 1997) (quoting a study by the Institute for International Economics that ana-
lyzed the impact of economic sanctions on American companies).
2. See Richard N. Haass, Sanction- With Care, WASH. POST, July 27, 1997,
at C9 (stating that "[s]anctions ... offer U.S. policymakers and members of Con-
gress an attractive compromise between doing nothing and sending in the Ma-
rines"). Haass, who served as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to
President George Bush and currently is the Director of Foreign Policy Studies at
the Brookings Institution, argues that Congress and the President should "stop us-
ing sanctions as a gesture or [an expression of] anger." Id. Haass believes the
United States is using sanctions "cavalierly, with scant regard to their actual im-
pact on American interests." Id. Further, Haass concludes that treating economic
sanctions less seriously than other policy tools will hurt only American businesses
and national security interests. See id.
3. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541
[hereinafter ILSA].
4. See infra notes 17 and 39 and accompanying text (discussing conclusions
by the United States government that Iran and Libya sponsor terrorism and seek to
acquire weapons of mass destruction).
5. See Alison Mitchell, Clinton Signs Bill Against Investing in Iran and Libya,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1996, at Al (addressing United States allies, President
Clinton stated: "You cannot do business with countries that practice commerce
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to its trading partners: deal either with Iran and Libya or the United
States, but not both. America's trading partners and economic al-
lies-particularly the European Union-refuse to support to ILSA,
and accuse the United States of unilaterally imposing its policy on
the rest of the world in violation of its international obligations.
While American allies are declining to enact sanctions of their own
against Iran and Libya, foreign companies are openly pursuing inin-
vestment ventures in defiance of ILSA.
Part I of this Comment reviews the legacy of sanctions levied
against Iran and Libya. Part II analyzes the issues raised by Amer-
ica's trading partners, including accusations of violations of the
United States' obligations to facilitate free trade and unwarranted
unilateralism in a supposedly increasingly multilateral world. Part III
investigates the actual enforcement of the sanctions, discusses rea-
sons why unilateral American sanctions may not be working as de-
signed, and presents options for United States policy.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE HISTORY OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN AND LIBYA
The imposition of economic sanctions6 against Iran and Libya by
the United States is not a new phenomenon.' Iran and Libya long
with you by day while funding or protecting the terrorists who kill you and your
innocent civilians by night").
6. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND UNITED STATES
TRADE 11-13 (1990) (discussing the basics of economic sanctions). The term
"economic sanctions" is defined differently among scholars as either "the deliber-
ate government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of 'customary' trade
or financial relations," or "coercive economic measures taken against one or more
countries to force a change in policies, or at least to demonstrate a country's opin-
ion about the other's policies." Id. at 12. Malloy describes economic sanctions as
"any country-specific economic or financial prohibition imposed upon a target
country or its nationals with the intended effect of creating dysfunction in com-
mercial and financial transactions with respect to the specified target, in the service
of specified foreign policy purposes." Id at 13.
7. See, e.g., MALLOY, supra note 6, at 202-12, 217-18, 499-530 (setting forth
the financial and trade restrictions imposed against Iran and Libya and discussing
the scope and impact of sanctions, licensing policies, and interpretive problems
related to Libya); Anne Q. Connaughton, Exporting to Special Destinations: Ter-
rorist-Supporting and Embargoed Countries, 748 PRACTICING L. INsT. 353, 376-
92 (1996) (outlining the background, current controls, and licensing policy of
1997] 399
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have been considered rogue nations, known as "renegade[s] [who]
spurn international norms."' As a result, other nations feel justified
in taking action to reform their conduct. For nearly twenty years,
American foreign policy has included economic sanctions as a means
to proscribe the activities of rogue nations,9 but despite this continu-
ing effort, many such nations continue to flout international law.
ILSA is the latest endeavor to pressure Iran and Libya to conform
their conduct to the international community's standards.
1. Iranian Sanctions
The United States first instituted sanctions against Iran in Novem-
ber of 1979, when Iranian militants seized the American embassy in
Tehran and took 66 hostages.'0 President Jimmy Carter responded by
halting all Iranian crude oil imports." Ten days after the seizure, he
declared a national emergency under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA") and froze 3 all Iranian assets in
comprehensive embargoes imposed on Libya and Iran).
8. W. Fletcher Fairey, Comment, The Helms-Burton Act: The Effect of Inter-
national Law on Domestic Implementation, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1289, 1290 n.3
(1997) (quoting Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 813 F. Supp. 22, 26
(D.D.C. 1992) and discussing the nature and behavior of rogue nations).
9. See, e.g., MALLOY, supra note 6 (discussing the history of sanctions, cur-
rent sanction programs, and general issues related to sanctions, including scope,
policy, and authority); Connaughton, supra note 7 (discussing embargoes and
countries subject to them); GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
RECONSIDERED (2d ed. 1990) (presenting the Institute for International Econom-
ics' analysis of the use of economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes).
10. See MALLOY, supra note 6, at 202-03.
11. See id. at 204 & n.6; see also 44 Fed. Reg. 67,602 (1979).
12. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (providing the President with
the authority to act in a "national emergency," which is any "unusual and extraor-
dinary threat which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United
States to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States").
See also MALLOY, supra note 6, at 205-07. To use the power granted by IEEPA,
the President has to declare a national emergency in response to a specific threat.
See id. at 165. IEEPA also requires the President to consult with Congress. See 50
U.S.C. § 1703(a). The Iranian hostage crisis marked the first time the President in-
voked powers granted by IEEPA. See MALLOY, supra note 6, at 172, 202-03.
13. See MALLOY, supra note 6, at 293 n.18. Freezing assets is also known as
"blocking." See id The Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 500
(1996), defines a "blocked account" as "an account in which any designated na-
tional has an interest, with respect to which account payments, transfers or with-
drawals o[r] other dealings may not be made or effected except pursuant to an
authorization or license authorizing such action." See 31 C.F.R. § 500.319; see
400 [13:397
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the United States.1 4 When these actions did not cause the Iranians to
release the hostages, in April of 1980, Carter increased the pressure
on the Khomeni regime by implementing two executive orders"5 and
expanding the blocking regulations into a trade embargo. 6 Four
years later, when it determined that Iran had been involved in the
1983 bombing of the United States Marines barracks in Beirut, the
Reagan Administration placed Iran on a list of state sponsors of ter-
rorism. 7 The Iranian Transactions Regulations,"s issued in 1987 by
the Commerce Department, further prohibited the importation of
goods and services of Iranian origin.' 9 These regulations included
products with potential military application."
In May of 1995, the Clinton Administration instituted its own eco-
nomic sanctions against Iran.2 Citing as motivating factors "Iran's
also MALLOY, supra note 6, at 205, 293 n.18.
14. See H.R. REP. No. 104-523, pt. 1, at 9 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1296, 1298 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 104-523(I)]; see also Exec.
Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979) ("Blocking Iranian Government
Property"); MALLOY, supra note 6, at 205-06 (explaining that President Carter
delegated to the Secretary of Treasury the power to create the necessary imple-
menting regulations, and that same day, the Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) issued the Iranian Assets Control Regulations (31 C.F.R. pt. 535 (1979)).
The President has renewed the declaration of national emergency with respect to
Iran every year since 1979. See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(1), supra, at 9.
15. See Exec. Order No. 12,205, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,099 (1980) ("Prohibiting
Certain Transactions with Iran"); see also Exec. Order No. 12,211, 45 Fed. Reg.
26,685 (1980) ("Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Iran").
16. See 31 C.F.R. § 535.207 (1996); see also MALLOY, supra note 6, at 209.
After an intense 444 days in captivity, the Iranians released the American hostages.
See Bernard Gwertzman, Reagan Takes Oath as 4 0
th President; Promises An
"Era of National Renewal"-Minutes Later, 52 U.S. Hostages in Iran Fly to
Freedom After 444-day Ordeal, N.Y. TImES, Jan. 21, 1981, at Al. Fulfilling its
part of the negotiated settlement, the United States unfroze the Iranian assets held
by twelve American banks. See id; see also MALLOY, supra note 6, at 209-10.
17. See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(I), supra note 14, at 9. Being on the list pre-
vents Iran from receiving "U.S. foreign aid, sales of items on the U.S. munitions
list, Eximbank credits, and U.S. support for foreign loans," as well as "requires
strict licensing requirements for any U.S. exports of controlled goods or technol-
ogy." Id; see also Connaughton, supra note 7, at 384-92 (setting forth the back-
ground, current controls, and licensing policy of Iran embargo).
18. See 31 C.F.R. pt. 560 (1987) ("Iranian Transactions Regulations").
19. See id § 560.201 ("Prohibited Importation of Goods and Services from
Iran"); see also MALLOY, supra note 6, at 210-12, & n.45.
20. See 52 Fed. Reg. 45,309 (1987); see also Connaughton, supra note 7, at
387 (detailing the Presidential Statement of October 26, 1987)
21. See Exec. Order No. 12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (1995) ('Prohibiting
1997]
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appetite for acquiring and developing nuclear weapons"22 as well as
"its role as inspiration and paymaster to terrorists," 3 President
Clinton signed an executive order prohibiting American trade and in-
vestment with Iran.24 The proclamation banned United States compa-
nies from purchasing oil from Iranian corporations. Not inciden-
tally, the executive order dealt with the same subject matter as
legislation introduced earlier in the year by Senator Alphonse
D'Amato of New York.26 The Clinton Administration opposed
Senator D'Amato's law as an overly broad extension of United
States law27 because the legislation targeted foreign, rather than
American, companies.2"
In the year following the imposition of sanctions, government of-
ficials expressed differing opinions regarding the effectiveness of the
Certain Transactions with Iran"); see also Gary G. Yerkey, United States to Ban
Trade, Investment with Iran, President Clinton Says, 12 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
781 (May 3, 1995) (noting that this executive order marked the second time Presi-
dent Clinton instituted prohibitions). In March 1995, the President banned Ameri-
can companies from developing oil resources in Iran. See id. A $1 billion agree-
ment between Iran and Conoco, Inc. to develop two Persian Gulf oil fields
instigated the executive order. See id
22. Yerkey, supra note 21, at 781.
23. Id.
24. See Exec. Order No. 12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,757 (1995); see also Yerkey,
supra note 21, at 781 (explaining that the order prohibited all exports to Iran ex-
cept those intended for humanitarian purposes, such as food and medicine).
25. See Yerkey, supra note 21, at 781. Additionally, while the order prohibited
American investment in Iran, it did not invalidate existing bank transactions be-
tween the United States and Iran. See id.
26. See S. 277, 104th Cong. (1995) (The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Act);
see also S. 630, 104th Cong. (1995) (The Iran Foreign Sanctions Act of 1995).
Senator D'Amato drafted these two pieces of legislation regarding sanctions to-
ward Iran, however, the Senate did not take any floor action on either of these
bills. After President Clinton announced his embargo, D'Amato proposed the third
iteration of his bill, the Iran Foreign Sanctions Act, which would impose sanctions
on any foreign company which exported petroleum products, natural gas and re-
lated technology to Iran. See S. 1228, 104th Cong. (1995).
27. See Yerkey, supra note 21, at 781 (noting the Administration's hesitancy
regarding the proposal's "'overextending extraterritorial jurisdiction' of U.S.
law").
28. See id. The Administration worried that United States trading partners
would vehemently oppose the foreign company feature of the legislation and that
such a reaction would shift attention away from the overall purpose of the pro-
posed bill, pressuring Iran to stop sponsoring terrorism and acquiring weapons of
mass destruction by hampering its economy and denying it needed revenue. See id.
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Clinton Administration embargo." A senior Central Intelligence
Agency ("CIA") official, John C. Gannon, argued that the sanctions
would only have a minimal impact on Iran because it had "alterna-
tive suppliers,"3 allowing development projects, maintenance, and
repairs to proceed once foreign companies took the place of Ameri-
can businesses. Furthermore, without the fall force of the interna-
tional community behind the measures, the United States sanctions
would not compel Iran to change its behavior. 2 On the other hand,
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tamoff disagreed
with Gannon's assessment3 and believed that, in only six months
time, the embargo had impacted Iran." Nonetheless, the Undersec-
retary testified that the impact of the sanctions would increase sig-
nificantly35 if Western Europe and Japan joined the embargo.3
2. Libyan Sanctions.
Both the United States37 and the United Nations38 have imposed
sanctions on Libya. Like those against Iran, the Libyan sanctions re-
sulted from the conclusion that Libya's government, led by Colonel
Muammar el-Qaddafi, sponsored acts of terrorism.9 Prior to the
29. See United States Sanctions Against Iran Will Have Little Impact Over
Long Term, CIA Says, 12 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1739 (Oct. 18, 1995) [herein-
after Little Impact Over Long Term].
30. See id Gannon testified that Iran had developed relationships with "hun-
dreds" of non-United States firms that would take over the roles of the American
companies. See id
31. See id The side effects of the embargo would include, according to Gan-
non, higher oil prices in the short term, "disrupt[ions to] individual Iranian busi-
nesses, and.. delay [of] some infrastructure projects." ld
32. See Little Impact Over Long Term, supra note 29, at 1739.
33. See id
34. See id (stating that Tarnoff cited the decrease of Iran's hard currency re-
serves as evidence of the embargo's impact on Iran).
35. See id
36. See Little Impact Over Long Term, supra note 29, at 1739. The Undersec-
retary believed that the international community's common interest in proscribing
Iran's threatening behavior outweighed the "narrow economic benefits" of trade
with Iran. See ie
37. See discussion infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text (detailing United
States sanctions against Libya).
38. See discussion infra notes 55-68 and accompanying text (describing United
Nations sanctions against Libya).
39. See Connaughton, supra note 7, at 376 n.33 (noting that on December 29,
1979, the United States placed Libya on the list of nations which have "repeatedly
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United Nation's international sanctions against Libya, the United
States had taken its own actions.40 In the early 1980s, the American
government sought to curb Libya's rogue activities by restricting the
issuance of export licenses.4' Attempting to exploit Libya's reliance
on oil as its major source of revenue, President Reagan issued a
Presidential Proclamation on March 10, 1982, banning the importa-
tion of Libyan oil or petroleum products.42 In early 1986, President
Reagan announced a new round of sanctions43 after learning that
provided support for acts of international terrorism"). Pursuant to § 6 of the Ex-
port Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. § 2401 (1994), the Secretary of State presently
lists the following countries as supporters of international terrorism: Cuba, Iran,
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. See id. at 357 n.1; see also Bernard
Weinraub, Terrorists Train at 15 Libyan Sites, United States Official Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 1986, at Al (reporting that American intelligence sources revealed
camps in Libya where Palestinian guerillas and other terrorists were training). A
State Department spokesman noted that "the links between international terrorism
and Libya are clear." Id
40. See generally Connaughton, supra note 7, at 376-82 (outlining the history
of United States actions against Libya from 1979 to 1993).
41. See id. at 377-78. One month after the United States shot down two Libyan
fighter planes that had fired upon American maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra, the
Commerce Department issued an order restricting the use of parts of United States
origin for servicing Libyan aircraft. See id. at 377. The order also prohibited the
use of bulk licenses for exports of aircraft parts for aircraft owned or operated by
the Libyan government or Libyan nationals. See id.; see also 46 Fed. Reg. 47,066
(1981). The Commerce Department revised these controls one month later to in-
clude the export of aircraft and aircraft parts to Libya. See Connaughton, supra
note 7, at 378; see also 46 Fed. Reg. 47066 (1981). Through these regulations the
United States attempted to monitor the maintenance of all aircraft that Libya could
use in support of its military intervention in neighboring countries. See Con-
naughton, supra note 7, at 378. On March 12, 1982, the United States expanded its
restrictions against Libya by widening its licensing policy into one of "general de-
nial." See Connaughton, supra note 7, at 378; 47 Fed. Reg. 11,247 (1982). As a
result, a license was required for every export except food; medicine and medical
supplies; items permitted under certain special purpose general licenses; and non-
strategic foreign-produced direct product of United States-origin technical data.
See Connaughton, supra note 7, at 378.
42. See Presidential Proclamation 4907, 1982 PUB. PAPERS 271-72 (1982)
(prohibiting the importation of Libyan crude oil because revenues received by
Libya from the sale of oil threatened United States national security); see also
Weinraub, supra note 39, at Al (noting that the United States spent an average of
five to seven billion dollars a year on imported Libyan crude oil prior to the 1981
ban).
43. See 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 21 (Jan. 7, 1986) (declaring a national
emergency and announcing sanctions against Libya); see also Weinraub, supra
note 39, at Al (characterizing the additional economic sanctions as retaliation for
Libya's support of international terrorism).
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Libya played a role in the 1985 bomb attacks at the Rome and Vi-
enna airports. 44 Invoking the national emergency authority of
IEEPA,4' the Reagan Administration imposed trade sanctions" that
prohibited the importation of Libyan goods and services4 as well as
the export of American goods, technology, and services." The fol-
lowing day, the Administration announced finance-related sanc-
tions 9 freezing Libyan assets in the United States" and banning
American firms from extending credits or loans to the Libyan gov-
ernment.5 The Libyan Sanctions Regulations' remain in effect to-
day.
5 3
Whereas the 1982 and 1986 sanctions were unilateral acts on the
part of the United States,5' the sanctions instituted this decade claim
44. See Weinraub, supra note 39, at Al. The two attacks on December 27,
1985 killed nineteen people, including five Americans. See id
45. See supra note 12 (discussing the powers granted to the President under
IEEPA).
46. See Exec. Order No. 12,543, 51 Fed. Reg. 875 (1986) ("Prohibiting Trade
and Certain Transactions Involving Libya"); see also Libyan Sanctions Regula-
tions, 31 C.F.R. pt. 550 (1996).
47. See 31 C.F.R. § 550.201 (1996) (declaring that all imports of Libyan ori-
gin, except publications and news materials, were prohibited); see also MALLOY,
supra note 6, at 503-04.
48. See 31 C.F.R. § 550.202 (1996) (describing prohibited exports). The ban
does not include publications or donated humanitarian items such as food, cloth-
ing, medicine or medical supplies. See id; see also MAL.OY, supra note 6, at 505-
06.
49. See Exec. Order No. 12,544, 51 Fed. Reg. 1235 (1986) ("Blocking Libyan
Government Property in the United States or Held by U.S. Persons").
50. See 31 C.F.R. § 550.209 (1996) (describing prohibited transactions in-
volving property, interests in property, or securities).
51. See 31 C.F.R. § 550.206 (1996) (mandating that United States individuals
may not grant or extend credit or loans to Libya).
52. See 31 C.F.R. pt. 550 (1996).
53. See Connaughton, supra note 7, at 382-83 (discussing current controls over
all exports and transshipments to Libya from the United States). Under the Libyan
Sanctions Regulations, all exports and transshipments are subject to a presumption
of denial and, therefore, require prior written permission of the Treasury Depart-
ment. See id at 381-82. Transshipments are exports that are transferred to an in-
termediary prior to its ultimate destination. See id at 380. Both exports and trans-
shipments are subject to the current controls when the exporter knows, or has
reason to know, that the exported goods are intended for Libya directly, or are spe-
cifically intended to be incorporated into a product to be purchased by or used in
Libya. See id.
54. See Allies Are Cool to Reagan's Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1986, at A8
(noting the "tepid response" of European governments and Japan, as well as the
1997] 405
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the force of the United Nations Security Council behind them." In
March 1992, after Libya refused to hand over suspects implicated in
the bombings of both Pan Am flight 103 and the French airliner
U.T.A. flight 772,56 the Security Council imposed a ban 7 on air
travel 8 and arms sales 9 to Libya. The sanctions, however, did not
include the export of oil.60 Over a year later, as the Libyan govern-
doubts expressed regarding the merits of the sanctions); see also Weinraub, supra
note 39, at Al (stating that Administration officials were "plainly annoyed" by the
allies' lack of support). The United States pursued the sanctions although officials
admitted the success rate would be higher with a collective effort. See id.
55. See U.N. Security Council Resolution 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3033rd
mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1731 (1992) [hereinafter Resolution 73 1]. On January
21, 1992, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 731, which con-
tained its condemnation of Libya's participation in terrorist activities, particularly
the bombing of Pan Am flight 103. See id. 1. Furthermore, the Resolution urged
the Libyan government to respond to various requests to cooperate in establishing
responsibility for the bombing of Pan Am flight 103. Id. 3.
56. See Paul Lewis, Security Council Votes to Prohibit Arms Exports and
Flights to Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1992, at Al (discussing the Security Coun-
cil's vote to impose sanctions unless Libya surrenders agents from recent terrorist
attacks). The Security Council wanted Libya to turn over, either to the United
States or Britain, the two Libyan citizens accused of executing the Pan Am explo-
sion over Lockerbie in 1988, as well as the four Libyans implicated in the bomb-
ing of U.T.A. flight 772 over the Sahara Desert in 1989. See id. Four hundred and
forty people, from thirty countries, died in the two explosions. See id.
57. See U.N. Security Council Resolution 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063rd
mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1748 (1992) [hereinafter Resolution 748] (reaffirming
that, in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations charter,
"every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or par-
ticipating in terrorist acts [of] another State or acquiescing in organized activities
within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts"). The Security
Council concluded that Libya had failed to renounce terrorism and to respond to
Resolution 731 and, thus, determined that Libya "constituted a threat to interna-
tional peace and security." Id. at 2.
58. See id. Paragraph 4 of Resolution 748 provides that all states shall:
(a) Deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory if
it is destined to land in or has taken off from the territory of Libya ... ;
(b) Prohibit... the supply of any aircraft or aircraft components to Libya, the provi-
sion of engineering and maintenance servicing of Libyan aircraft or aircraft compo-
nents, the certification of air-worthiness for Libyan aircraft, the payment of new claims
against existing insurance contracts and the provision of new direct insurance for Lib-
yan aircraft.
Id 4.
59. See Resolution 748, supra note 57, 5 (stating that all states shall prohibit
the sale or transfer of any weapon, ammunition, or military equipment, as well as
supplies for the manufacture or maintenance of such items).
60. See Lewis, supra note 56, at Al (emphasizing that oil is Libya's main eco-
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ment still refused to surrender the two men indicted in connection
with Pan Am 103, the Security Council issued a new set of sanc-
tions.6 This second round of sanctions froze all of Libya's overseas
assets,62 banned the sale of oil-refining and pipeline equipment, 63 and
tightened the 1992 United Nations sanctions. 64 The resolution again
did not establish a total prohibition on Libyan oil exports. 6' Further-
more, the provision blocking Libyan assets did not apply to funds
"derived from the sale or supply of any petroleum or petroleum
products" after the effective date of the resolution, provided that the
funds were paid into a separate bank account set up solely for the
purpose of holding such funds.66 Thus, although designed to coerce
Libyan compliance with the substance of the resolutions, the United
Nations' measures did not absolutely cripple Libya's most valuable
asset-the sale of oil. 67 As a result, the Libyan government has yet to
nomic resource); see also Paul Lewis, UN. Tightens Sanctions Against Libya,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1993, at AlO (indicating that 98% of Libya's income comes
from oil, mostly via sales to Western Europe).
61. See U.N. Security Council Resolution 883, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3312th
mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1883 (1993) [hereinafter, Resolution 883].
62. See Resolution 883, supra note 61. Paragraph 3 directs that all states:
shall freeze such funds and financial resources [owned or controlled, directly or indi-
rectly by the government of Libya or any Libyan undertaking] and ensure that neither
they nor any other funds and financial resources are made available, by their nationals
or by any persons within their territory, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of
the Government or public authorities of Libya or any Libyan undertakings.
Id 3. Although the United Nations froze Libya's assets, the resolution required
that Libya still meet its obligations regarding the servicing and repayment of its
foreign debt. See id 11; see also Lewis, supra note 60, at A 10 (reporting that the
impact of freezing assets would not be devastating since "Libya had ample notice
that the restrictions were coming and ha[d] been able to hide much of its liquid
overseas assets").
63. Resolution 883, supra note 61, T 5, Annex. Resolution 883 sets forth a list
of items that United Nations member states are not permitted to sell or provide to
Libya. See id The list includes: pumps; equipment designed for use in crude oil
export terminals; equipment "not specially designed for use in crude oil export
terminals but which because of their large capacity can be used for this purpose;"
refinery equipment; and spare parts for the aforementioned equipment. Id
64. See id 6-7; see also Lewis, supra note 60, at AlO.
65. See Lewis, supra note 62, at A 10 (reporting that representatives of the
families of the victims of Pan Am 103 cautioned that only a full oil embargo
would force Qaddafi to surrender the suspects).
66. See Resolution 883, supra note 61. Thus, Libya will be able to obtain the
benefits of its oil contracts, provided that those funds are explicitly separate from
any other funds. See id
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meet the Security Council's demands.6"
B. THE PASSAGE OF THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF
1996.
Senator Alphonse D'Amato's brainchild-a law punishing Iran for
its sponsorship of terrorism and its drive to acquire weapons of mass
destruction-lay dormant in the Senate6 9 until it received renewed
interest following three incidents that occurred within a span of three
months. The bombing of the United States military apartment com-
plex in Saudi Arabia, the explosion of TWA flight 800, and the
Centennial Olympic Park bombing in Atlanta awakened American
fears of terrorist attacks.7" With these incidents in the background,
congressional policymakers resolved to hold the parties accountable
for their terrorist acts. The rationale for the sanctions is simple-if
the regimes do not have any money, they cannot provide the terror-
ists with the supplies necessary to accomplish their goals.7' In theory,
67. See Security Council Extends Libya Sanctions, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 31, 1995,
at A3 (stating that the United States urged other nations to participate in the oil
embargo to help toughen sanctions).
68. See id; see also 1995 U.N.Y.B. 408, 411, U.N. Sales No. E.96.I.1 (re-
cording a Security Council statement concluding that Libya's actions did not meet
the necessary conditions of the resolutions and, therefore, did not mandate the
lifting of the sanctions). The Security Council extended the sanctions against
Libya on March 30, 1995. See Security Council Extends Libya Sanctions, supra
note 67, at A3.
69. See Bruce W. Nelan, Taking on the World: Clinton Says the New Long Arm
of Uncle Sam is Striking at Terrorists, But Those Getting Hit are America's
Friends Abroad, TIME, Aug. 26, 1996, at 26.
70. See Mitchell, supra note 5, at Al. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry
suggested a few days later that there may have been an "international connection"
to the bombing in Saudi Arabia, perhaps an Iranian linkage. See id. Furthermore,
in the initial hours following the explosion of Flight 800, there were rumors that
the plane had been shot down by a terrorist's bomb. See Matthew Purdy, Explosion
Aboard TWA Flight 800, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1996, at Al. Presently, the investi-
gation into the cause of the explosion has not produced a definitive answer, al-
though a criminal act has been ruled out. See Robert Suro, Crime All But Ruled
Out in TWO Crash; FBI Details Exhaustive Probe; Focus Now on Mechanical
Failure, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1997, at Al (reporting that officials believe that
mechanical failure was the most likely cause).
71. See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(I), supra note 14, at 9 (quoting Undersecretary
of State Peter Tarnoff s October 1995 testimony: "By pressuring Iran's economy,
we seek to limit the government's finances and thereby constrict Tehran's ability
to fund rogue activities"); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-523, pt. 2, at 14 (1996), re-
printed in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1311, 1316-17 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 104-
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by limiting foreign access to Iran's and Libya's economies-in par-
ticular each country's oil and gas industries-revenue should de-
crease significantly." In essence, "fewer barrels means fewer dol-
lars"" and fewer dollars means less state-sponsored terrorism and
fewer weapons of mass destruction.74 In addition, Libya's long-
standing refusal to relinquish custody of two individuals facing
criminal indictment for allegedly blowing up Pan Am flight 103 fur-
ther motivated the law's drafters.7" Congress decided that it could
neither ignore nor condone such blatant disregard of the international
community's demands.
Senator D'Amato's proposed legislation was drastically altered by
the time President Clinton signed ILSA into law on August 5, 1996.76
Initially, Iran was the sole focus of the bill, and sanctions would be
levied against foreign companies that traded with the country."
Senator D'Amato sought to penalize companies that traded with Iran
by preventing them from selling their products in the United States. 9
The Clinton Administrations° was opposed to banning non-United
States trade with Iran. In fact, Acting Assistant Secretary of State C.
David Welch cautioned that such a ban would be ineffective and
counterproductive,8 ' since the cost of unilaterally enforcing the ban
523(11)].
72. See Iran and Libya Sanctions: Hearings on H.R 3107 Before the Sub-
comm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong., at 7
(1996) (statement of C. David Welch, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs, Dep't of State) [hereinafter Welch Statement]; see also H.R. REP.
No. 104-523(1), supra note 14, at 9-10.
73. Welch Statement, supra note 72, at 7.
74. See H.R. REP. No. 104-523 (1), supra note 14, at 9-10.
75. See H.R. REP. No. 104-523 (II), supra note 71, at 10.
76. See Mitchell, supra note 5, at Al.
77. See 141 CoNG. REc. S19011 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995). Toward the end of
the bill's life in the Senate, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) proposed an
amendment to impose sanctions on those entities that invested in Libya. See id.
78. See The Iran Foreign Sanctions Act, S. 1228, 104th Cong. (1995); see also
Mitchell, supra note 5, at Al.
79. See The Iran Foreign Sanctions Act, S. 1228, 104th Cong. (1995); see
Mitchell, supra note 5, at Al.
80. See Welch Statement. supra note 72, at 7; see also Iran and Libya Sanc-
tions: Hearings on H. R. 3107 Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm.
on Ways and Mean., 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Ambassador Jennifer Hill-
man, General Counsel, Office of United States Trade Representative) [hereinafter
Hillman Statement].
81. See Welch Statement, supra note 72, at 7.
1997] 409
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
and absorbing the retaliatory measures by other governments would
be far too high. Welch further testified that it would be pointless to
attempt to prevent foreign investment in Libya since there is a con-
siderable foreign presence in the Libyan economy. Finally, the
Administration successfully fought to remove from the legislation
sanctions on financial institutions that provide loans for parties in-
volved in Iranian investment deals.'
In its final form, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
(" ILSA" )85 severely restricted foreign corporations from investing in
the Iranian and Libyan petroleum industries, 86 and banned trade with
82. See id.
83. See id. Libya has contracts with over two dozen foreign corporations to
produce and develop Libya's oil resources. See id, Welch postulated that various
nations might move to protect their nationals' interests. See id. Despite the Assis-
tant Secretary's warning, lawmakers did not heed this advice. See ILSA supra note
3, § 5(b)(2).
84. See Welch Statement, supra note 72. Such a provision could damage
United States lending institutions, be disruptive to financial markets, "reduce the
attractiveness" of the United States as a financial center, and invite retaliation. See
id; see also Clyde Mitchell, The New Sanctions Act, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 21, 1996, at 1
(commenting on ILSA's potential effect on the American banking community).
85. See ILSA, supra note 3.
86. See id. § 5(b)(2) (providing that, subject to certain exceptions, sanctions
shall be imposed upon any person that has, with actual knowledge, made an in-
vestment of $40 million or more that significantly contributed to the enhancement
of Libya's ability to develop its petroleum resources). Investment is defimed to in-
clude the following activities:
(A) The entry into a contract that includes responsibility for the development of pe-
troleum resources located in Iran or Libya (as the case may be), or the entry into a
contract providing for the general supervision and guarantee of another person's per-
formance of such a contract; (B) The purchase of a share of ownership, including an
equity interest, in that development; [or] (C) The entry into a contract providing for
the participation in royalties, earnings, or profits in that development, without regard
to the form of the participation.
Id. § 14(9). Investment "does not include the entry into, performance, or financing
of a contract to sell or purchase goods, services, or technology." Id. In addition,
development is "the exploration for or the extraction, refining, or transportation by
pipeline, of petroleum resources." Id § 14(4). On December 16, 1996, the State
Department issued a release in the Federal Register clarifying some of the termi-
nology in ILSA. See 61 Fed. Reg. 66,067 (Dec. 16, 1996); see also State Depart-
ment Issues Guidance Clarifying Iran-Libya Sanctions Law, 13 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1967 (1996) [hereinafter State Department Issues Guidance]. This "guid-
ance" is not a set of criterion for enforcement. See State Dept. Has Targeted 12
Foreign Firms for Possible Boycott Action Under 1LSA, BOYCOTTr L. BULL., Feb.
10, 1997, at 1 [hereinafter 12 Foreign Firms] (reporting that the State Department
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Libya in goods already prohibited by United Nations Security Coun-
cil Resolutions." The United States will impose sanctions only when
an offender possesses actual knowledge of a prohibited activity."' For
corporate parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates to be liable for the con-
duct, they must engage in the prohibited activity.8 If the President
determines that a foreign company has violated the law, he must im-
pose two or more of the following sanctions:9" the denial of Export-
Import Bank assistance 9 for exports; the denial of export licenses;'
the prohibition on United States financial institutions from extending
loans to the sanctioned person totaling more than $10 million;93 the
prohibition on being designated a primary dealer of United States
government debt instruments or serving as a repository for United
States government funds, if the sanctioned person is a financial in-
does not intend to issue any rules or informal guidelines). A State Department of-
ficial commented that when the law is applied in response to a foreign company's
project, the Department will refine specific issues regarding enforcement. See id
87. See ILSA, supra note 3, § 5(b)(1). The President must impose sanctions
against any person who has, with actual knowledge, exported, transferred, or oth-
erwise provided Libya with "any goods, services, technology, or other items the
provision of which is prohibited" under paragraphs 4(b) or 5 of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 748 or paragraphs 5 or 6 of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 883 "if the provision of such items significantly or materially"
contributed to Libya's ability to acquire specific weapons, develop its petroleum
resources, or maintain its aviation capabilities. Id
88. See id § 5(c).
89. See id This provision is aimed at limiting the liability of parent companies,
subsidiaries, and affiliates that are unaware of the banned activity. The State De-
partment-issued guidance indicates that the term "engaged" refers to the "facilita-
tion and authorization of the entry into a prohibited contract." See State Depart-
ment Issues Guidance, supra note 86, at 1967. Furthermore, only activity
occurring after the effective date of ILSA, August 5, 1996, will trigger sanctions.
See ILSA, supra note 3, § 13(a).
90. See ILSA, supra note 3, § 5(b). There are several exceptions to the imposi-
tion of sanctions. See ide § 5(f). For example, the President does not have to issue
sanctions if "the President determines in writing that the person to which the sanc-
tions would otherwise be applied is a sole source supplier of the defense articles or
services, that the defense articles or services are essential [to national security],
and that alternative sources are not readily or reasonably available."Id §
5(f)(1)(B).
91. See id § 6(1). The assistance could include the "issuance of any guarantee,
insurance, [or] extension of credit... [regarding] the export of any goods or serv-
ices to any sanctioned person." Id
92. See ILSA, supra note 3, § 6(2).
93. See id § 6(3).
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stitution;94 the prohibition on entering into a procurement contract
with the United States government;95 and any other restrictions the
President sees fit to impose in accordance with IEEPA.96 Contracts
executed prior to ILSA's effective date are not subject to sanctions.
97
The President must impose sanctions for a period of at least two
years.98 The chief executive may revoke the sanctions after the first
year, however, if he determines that the sanctioned person no longer
engages in the prohibited activity. 9 The President, furthermore, may
terminate sanctions with regard to Iranian investment when Iran has
ceased its efforts to manufacture or acquire weapons of mass de-
struction, and the United States has removed it from the list of states
who sponsor international terrorism.' With regard to Libyan in-
vestment and trade, Libya must comply with United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 before the United States will
lift the sanctions.'
Critics, who view the law an impermissible unilateral action, 2
often have overlooked the provision urging the President to pursue a
multilateral sanctions regime to accomplish the legislation's goals.0 3
The law encourages the President to immediately initiate diplomatic
efforts in international forums and work bilaterally with American
allies to create multilateral sanctions against Iran."' The language in
§4(a),0 5 however, does not include the mandatory compulsion the
other sections of the legislation do, and therefore this section does
94. See id. § 6(4).
95. See id. § 6(5).
96. See id. § 6(6). For a discussion of lEEPA, see supra note 12.
97. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(II), supra note 71, at 20.
98. See ILSA, supra note 3, § 9(b)(1).
99. See id. § 9(b)(2).
100. See id. § 8(a)(1)-(2).
101. See id. § 8(b).
102. See discussion infra Part II A-B (analyzing global reaction to ILSA).
103. See ILSA, supra note 3, § 4.
104. See id. § 4. The President must report to Congress regarding the success of
his efforts to establish multilateral sanctions. See id. § 4(b). The report must in-
clude: (1) a list of the countries that have agreed to take such measures and a de-
scription of the sanctions; and (2) a list of those countries that have not agreed to
impose sanctions, with a description of any measures that the President recom-
mends, with respect to those countries, to further the objective of limiting the abil-
ity of Iran to support international acts of terrorism. See id. § 4(b)(1)-(2).
105. See id § 4(a) (providing that "Congress urges").
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not require the President to pursue multilateral sanctions. In addition,
the President is given the authority to waive the application of sanc-
tions on a country's nationals if the country agrees to institute its
own "substantial measures," such as economic sanctions of a com-
parable quality to those of ILSA."'0
II. GLOBAL REACTION TO ILSA
A. AMERICAN TRADING PARTNERS CLAIM ILSA VIOLATES
UNITED STATES' INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
Very few people support ILSA 07 Coming on the heels of the Cu-
106. See id § 4(c)(1).
107. Perhaps the only domestic supporters of the law are Congress, President
Clinton, and the families of the victims of Pan Am 103, for whom the Libyan
sanctions were added to the original core of the sanctions, and who were present at
the signing of the bill. See Remarks by President Clinton, Iran-Libya Sanctions
Act Signing Ceremony, 7 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 32 (Aug. 5, 1996). The American
business community opposes the law because it opposes any economic sanctions
that decrease market accessibility and cost American jobs. See Louis Uchitelle,
Who's Punishing Whom?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. II, 1996, at DI (reviewing corporate
America's position on unilateral sanctions). One executive argued that American
policymakers are not considering the totality of the consequences: " W hat the poli-
ticians forget is that these foreign companies are our customers and suppliers, or
they invest in America. We are cutting off our nose to spite our face, presenting
ourselves as capricious and unreliable." Id; see also Countries Targeted by U.S.,
14 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 421 (Mar. 5, 1997) (quoting the National Association
of Manufacturers official position that "unilateral sanctions are little more than
postage stamps we send to other countries at the cost of thousands of American
jobs"). In addition to industry representatives, many policymakers find fault with
ILSA. See Martin Walker, Master of the Universe, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 7, 1996,
at 13 (reporting that former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger was "both-
ered by our attempt at enforced implementation"). A member of the House Com-
mittee on International Relations, Representative Lee Hamilton (D-IN), asserted
that ILSA and Helms-Burton pose several risks to American interests. See Lee
Hamilton, America's Risky Sanctions, J. CoM., Aug. 20, 1996, at 6A. First, sanc-
tions could reduce multilateral cooperation among United States trading partners.
See id Second, the sanctions could jeopardize American investments. See id
Third, enacting these laws in the name of national security might encourage other
countries to do the same thing. See id Finally, "imposing sanctions could under-
mine longstanding U.S. leadership on international trade issues." Id That could
result in the decreased ability to set the agenda in trade talks. See id Representa-
tive Toby Roth (R-WI) argued that ILSA would actually benefit Iran and Libya.
See Toby Roth, New Iranian-Libyan Sanctions Will Only Hurt US., WAL ST. J.,
Aug. 6, 1996, at A14 (asserting that the United States is ignoring Europe's close
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ban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, or Helms-
Burton,"°' the passage of ILSA marked the second time in six
months0 9 that the United States enacted secondary boycott"' legisla-
tion against foreign companies."' Allies and trading partners view
ILSA as the latest incident in the alarming trend of the United States
to act unilaterally in imposing its policies on other countries." 2
ties to both Iran and Libya, and concluding that ILSA could turn American allies
against the United States).
108. Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6021).
Helms-Burton sanctions foreign entities that "traffic" in American property con-
fiscated by Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba. See id. Furthermore, the law denies vi-
sas to the companies' executives and their families wishing to enter the United
States. See id.
109. Congress passed, and President Clinton signed, Helms-Burton on March
12, 1996. See President's Statement on Signing the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 478 (Mar. 12,
1996).
110. See Fairey, supra note 8, at 1312-13 (discussing secondary boycotts); see
also Andreas Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J.
INT'L L. 419, 429-30 (1996) (concluding that Helms-Burton is a classic secondary
boycott). Lowenfeld restates the definition of a secondary boycott in the following
way: "[S]tate A says that if X, a national of state C, trades with state B, X may not
trade with or invest in A. In other words, X is required to make a choice between
doing business with or in A, the boycotting state, and doing business with or in B,
the target state .... ." Id. There are three principles of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion-territorial, nationality and effects. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1987) (setting forth the bases of
jurisdiction to prescribe law). The territorial principle-jurisdiction based on con-
duct that takes place within a state's territory-is the most common basis of juris-
diction and engenders little controversy. See id. cmt. c. The nationality principle-
based on the status of the person or entity-is an "exceptional" basis for jurisdic-
tion. See id, at cmt. b, e. The main jurisdictional premise behind laws such as
Helms-Burton and ILSA is the theory of substantial effects, under which jurisdic-
tion is permitted regarding activities that occur outside the country, but have a sub-
stantial effect within the country. See Bradford T. Hammock, Note, The Extrater-
ritorial Application of the National Labor Relations Act: A Union Perspective, 22
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 127, 131 (1996) (citing the jurisdiction discussion
of United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d. Cir. 1945)).
In Alcoa, the Second Circuit held that conduct that had "intended or actual" or
"substantial or foreseeable" effects within a country provided sufficient contacts
to exert jurisdiction based on the substantial effects doctrine. See id.
111. See Canada Criticizes United States Iran-Libya Law as Unsupportable
Extraterritoriality, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1316 (Aug. 14, 1996) [hereinafter
Canada Criticizes] (indicating that opponents of the sanctions speak of the two
laws as a tandem).
112. See id. at 1316 (quoting Canadian International Trade Minister Art Eggle-
ton as saying "[t]he extraterritorial effects of this latest act represent once again an
[13:397
UNILATERAL SANCTIONS WITH A TWIST
1. Unwarranted Unilateralism
Although they do not dispute that terrorism is a threat to our
common interests,"' American trading partners do object to the man-
ner in which the United States attempts to eradicate that threat."4 The
end of the Cold War left the United States as the world's only super-
power--one that no longer feels it is necessary to consult with its
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") allies, who helped
provide a bulwark against the Soviet Union." 5 This open field' 6 al-
lows the United States to conduct its affairs with policies such as
ILSA that, in the words of European Union trade commissioner Sir
Leon Brittan, "establish the unwelcome principle that one country
can dictate the foreign policy of others." "7 The United States is pur-
attempt by the United States to dictate trade policy to its allies"); see also Sherle
R. Schwenniger, The Rift Over Rogues: Europeans are Disma.'ed by Washington's
Growing Contempt for Multilateralism, THE NATION, Oct. 7, 1996, at 21-22 (stat-
ing that in the immediate post-Cold War era, the United States government usually
consulted its allies, even if it did not act on their suggestions, but "[n]ow even the
pretense of coordination is gone"); United States Urges Congress to Rework Bill
to Punish Foreign Firms in Iran, Libya, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 903 (May
29, 1996) (quoting European Union Ambassador to the United States Hugo Pae-
men's May 21, 1996 letter to congressional leaders explaining that: "What causes
deep concern in the European Union is the proposal that the United States should
attempt to impose its terms on the rest of the world by adopting secondary boycott
legislation with extraterritorial effect .... ).
113. See Welch Statement, supra note 72, at 6 (stating that "there is little dis-
agreement about the threat such behavior poses to our common interests"); see
also Canada Criticizes, supra note 111, at 1316 (quoting Canadian Foreign Affairs
Minister Lloyd Axworthy as saying: " We have as strong an objection to any ter-
rorist activity as any United States congressman has. We will work with the
Americans, the Europeans and anybody else... [but] it should be done in concert,
in cooperation and in coordination, not unilaterally."); see also United States
Urges Congress to Rework Bill to Punish Foreign Firms in Iran, Libya, supra note
112, at 903 (reporting Hugo Paemen's comment that the American tactics--which
he characterized as "unilateral measures against Europe," not Iran or Libya-
serve to distract attention from the targeted regimes).
114. See Nelan, supra note 69, at 26 (quoting France's Foreign Ministry
spokesman, Yves Doutriaux's remarks that characterized ILSA as "one nation
telling the rest on earth what they can and can't do. Is that right?"). Furthermore,
French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette suggested that the law "ha[s] nothing
to do with terrorism" and is just a means of the United States to wield its un-
checked power. Id.
115. See Schwenninger, supra note 112, at 22 (explaining that now Washington
acts before consulting its allies).
116. See id
117. See Nelan, supra note 69, at 26.
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suing its own path, without substantive consultations, and is expect-
ing the world to follow.
International concern about American unilateralism amounts to
more than complaints about "lex Americana 1 8 or "political gang-
sterism." '19 Indeed, American trading partners argue that the United
States is destroying the integrity of international organizations 2 ' and
agreements.2 to which it is a party."' The cornerstone of the organi-
zations and agreements is multilateralism, and other nations contend
that such unilateral action runs counter to this principle.' In taking
unilateral steps to deal with perceived or actual threats, the United
States implies that it does not need to consider other countries' poli-
cies or concern itself with the collateral consequences of its own ap-
118. Id.
119. Id. at 27 (quoting two North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ambas-
sadors' reaction to the imposition of sanctions).
120. Such organizations include the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
121. These agreements include the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATM) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec.
17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289 and 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993).
122. In a letter to congressional leaders written several months before ILSA's
passage, Hugo Paemen, the European Union's ambassador to the United States,
and Ferdinando Salleo, the Italian ambassador to the United States, argued that the
various sanction proposals both violated international law and "depreciate[d] the
standing of international organizations such as the United Nations." See United
States Legislation on Iran, Libya Would Violate WTO Rules, EU Says, 13 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 219 (Feb. 7, 1996) (noting that "[a]ny unilateral action which
aims at imposing further measures outside that context can only undermine the
authority of the economic sanctions... If the United States government wishes
further measures to be implemented by the international community, it should in-
troduce them for discussion in the relevant international body ... This way of
unilaterally attempting to impose penalties on third parties disturbs international
trade and investment relations and depreciates the standing of internationally ac-
cepted fora for any such measures"). In another instance of unilateral action by the
United States, European allies warned of the "depreciation" of international or-
ganizations when President Clinton ordered cruise missile strikes against Iraq
stating, for example, that: "'[w]hatever its human and material cost, the crisis in
Iraq has already claimed an important institutional casualty': the United Nations
Security Council." See Schwenninger, supra note 112, at 22 (quoting a Financial
Times editorial).
123. See Schwenninger, supra note 112, at 22.
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proaches 2 4 Allies believe that the United States has certain obliga-
tions resulting from its memberships, just as the United States be-
lieves the allies have the same duties and responsibilities--reciproc-
ity is the bedrock of these multilateral organizations."'
Consequently, when the world's most powerful nation and economy
seems to flout, if not ignore, its obligations, our trading partners
worry about the impact on the legitimacy of the international organi-
zations.
126
2. GA7T and WTO Obligations
The United States emerged from World War I with an unprece-
dented level of power and authority and, as a result, the country was
instrumental in establishing the political and economic organizations
and agreements that would form the structure of the post-war
world.12 7 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),"'
124. See Nelan, supra note 69, at 27 (quoting Harvard University political sci-
entist Samuel Huntington's summary of the American viewpoint: "We have his-
torically thought of American values as being universal and ones we have the re-
sponsibility and obligation to induce other societies to accept.").
125. See BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: FROM GATT TO WTO 66-67 (1995)
[hereinafter HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI] (defining reciprocity as "the practice of
making an action conditional upon action by a counterpart" and stating that reci-
procity has been "a fundamental element in virtually all assaults on barriers to
trade, [since] governments generally [are] unwilling to liberalize unilaterally on a
[Most Favored Nation] basis").
126. See United States Legislation on Iran, Libya Would Violate WTO Rules,
EU Says, supra note 122, at 129 (stating that the United States should use the fo-
rums of international organizations rather than acting unilaterally).
127. See JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 9-10 (1990)
(explaining the role of the United States in GATT formation). The Allies designed
the post-war structures with the political and economic mistakes of the previous
twenty five years fresh in their minds. See id Historians argue that the Great De-
pression was one of the causes of World War HI, along with the reparations im-
posed on Germany after the first World War. See id at 9. Although the third point
of President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points advocated " [t]he removal, so far
as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade
conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating them-
selves for its maintenance," the United States, in the post World War I years, did
exactly the opposite. See VI ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW: PUBLIC CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 12-13 (2d ed. 1983). First,
Congress enacted the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of 1922, and then eight years
later, instituted the highest levels of tariffs in American history with the passage of
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, increasing rates from 38 to 52 percent. See
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which its creators envisioned not as an organization to which nations
would belong, but as a multilateral agreement or treaty to which
countries would adhere,'29 is the main trade mechanism that emerged
from the post-war negotiations. Now GATT is administered by the
World Trade Organization (" WTO" ),130 the international body
formed in 1995 to oversee and implement multilateral trade agree-
ments.13' Three major principles of international free trade are set
id. at 13; see also HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 125, at 3. Such measures
were not limited to the United States, however, as many nations "took many pro-
tectionist measures, including quota restrictions, which choked international
trade." LOWENFELD, supra, at 12; see also JACKSON, supra, at 10. Reflecting on
the events leading to World War II, world leaders created institutions to prevent
history from repeating itself. See JACKSON, supra, at 9-10. The 1944 Bretton
Woods Conference established the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), both of
which were designed to deal with monetary and banking issues. See id. at 10. In
late 1945, the United States proposed that certain nations get together to draft a
multilateral agreement for the mutual reduction of tariffs; soon thereafter, the
United Nations adopted a resolution to charter an "international trade organiza-
tion." See id.
128. See GATT, supra note 121.
129. In the drafting stage, the language of GATT suggested that GATT would
be an organization-an idea to which many United States congressmen objected.
See JACKSON, supra note 127, at 11-12. On the orders of Congress, American ne-
gotiators redrafted the general GATT clauses to remove the idea or implication of
it being an organization. See id. at 12.
130. In contrast to GATT, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is an interna-
tional organization with "member states," more akin to the United Nations in that
nature. See Jeffrey J. Schott, Challenges Facing the World Trade Organization, in
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: CHALLENGES AHEAD 5 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed.
1996). Schott states that this shift in status is significant because it "provides
greater legal coherence among its rights and obligations." Id. Despite the shift, the
new organization is closely related to GATT. See John H. Jackson, The WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Procedures: A Preliminary Appraisal, in THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM: CHALLENGES AHEAD 155 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed. 1996). Article I of the
WTO Charter mandates that the WTO shall be "guided by" practice and decisions.
See id.
131. The creation of the WTO was the culmination of the Uruguay Round of
negotiations that ended in 1994. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uru-
guay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1140 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]; see also HOEKMAN &
KOSTECKI, supra note 125, at 12; see also Raymond Vernon, The World Trade
Organization: A New Stage in International Trade and Development, 36 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 339, 340 (1995). Another important change in the transformation from
GATT to WTO is the "single package" or "single undertaking" idea contained in
the WTO Agreement, wherein all WTO members must accept all agreements. See
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forth in GATT:3 2 (1) parties should conduct trade on the basis of
non-discrimination;13 (2) parties should maintain government re-
straints on the movement of goods at a minimum, and if changed, the
restraints should be reduced, not increased; and (3) parties should
discuss and agree on the conditions of trade, including the level of
tariffs and other restrictions, within a multilateral framework.' 3
Other principles are vital to GATT as well, including the idea that
tariffs are the only restrictions to be implemented by contracting par-
ties.'35 Nonetheless, every principle is qualified by exceptions, grand-
father clauses, and special cases.' 36
a. The National Security Exception
Perhaps the most significant exception contained in GATT is the
national security exception of Article XXI.' 37 The Agreement does
not prevent any contracting party-and today, in the terms of VTO,
any member state-from "taking any action which it considers nec-
essary for the protection of its essential security interests... taken in
time of war or other emergency in international relations." 1 38 Argua-
bly, a state could justify any act inconsistent with GATT as one taken
in furtherance of its national security. As a result, the idea of national
security conceivably can incorporate so much that the obligations of
GATT have no real force.139 In fact, states have cited direct security
Schott, supra note 130, at 3. Previously, the contracting parties of GATT could
pick and choose which multilateral agreements they would accept. See id
132. See GATT, supra note 121, Art. I (setting for the criteria for Most Favored
Nation status); see also LOWENFELD, supra note 127, at 23.
133. See GATT, supra note 121, Art. I. The Most Favored Nation Clause of
GATT Article I states that countries should apply duties on imports equally, with-
out regard to origin. See LOWENFELD, supra note 127, at 23.
134. See GATT, supra note 121, Art. XXII (setting guidelines for discussions
among contracting nations that impose certain restrictions); see also LOWENFELD,
supra note 127, at 23.
135. See GATT, supra note 121, Art. XI (prohibiting quantitative restrictions or
quotas); see also LOWENFELD, supra note 127, at 23.
136. See LOWENFELD, supra note 127, at 24.
137. See GATT, supra note 121, Art. XXI (setting forth the national security
exception to compliance).
138. GATT, supra note 121, Art. XXI (b)(iii) (outlining the exception for action
taken in war or emergencies in international relations).
139. See Richard Sutherland Whitt, The Politics of Procedure: An Examination
of the GATT Dispute Settlement Panel and the Article XI Defense in the Context
of the United States Embargo of Nicaragua, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 603,
616-17 (1987) (describing the unilateral interpretation permitted by the exception
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measures, potential dangers, indirect threats, and domestic economic
security as rationales for an Article XXI exception. 4 Moreover,
member states are free to interpret Article XXI in whichever manner
suits them best since GATT and now the WTO have not issued a
formal interpretation of Article XXI). 41 It is striking that Article XXI,
unlike some other articles, does not caution against misuse of the na-
tional security exception.'42 Thus, the article is wide open for
abuse.1
43
If the United States were to defend ILSA in front of a WTO
panel,'" an Article XXI defense would be one of the primary ration-
ales behind the American arguments.'45 The drafters of ILSA put na-
tional security concerns at the forefront of their findings, stating that
and the lack of protections against misuse). In general, Whitt argues that potential
abuse of this broad exception "threatens to undercut the overall stability and good
will inherent in the GATT system." Id. at 605.
140. See id. at 620.
141. See id at 616-17.
142. See id (concluding that the provision encourages a unilateral interpretation
and fails to provide even a minor penalty for its misuse). In contrast, GATT Arti-
cle XX, which outlines the Agreement's general exceptions, states that the excep-
tions contained in the clause are "[s]ubject to the requirement that such measures
are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjusti-
fiable discrimination ... or a disguised restriction on international trade." Id at
616 n.86; see GATT, supra note 121, Art. XX.
143. See Whitt, supra note 139, at 621 (concluding that the combination of gen-
eral language and unilateral interpretation precludes any means of legal enforce-
ment otherwise provided by the provision).
144. See infra at notes 171-178 and accompanying text for a discussion noting
that the European Union did not institute a WTO panel.
145. See Rosella Brevetti et al., U.S. Says WTO Panel Not Competent to Judge
Cuba Dispute, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 351 (Feb. 26, 1997). When the Euro-
pean Union established a dispute panel for Helms-Burton in early 1997, American
officials indicated that they would prefer national security claims as justification
for passing the law. See id. Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade
Stuart Eizenstat stated that the panel should not proceed because the law was a
matter of American national security and foreign policy. See id. United States offi-
cials feared the prospect of a WTO panel "second-guessing" the national security
interests of the United States. See id Additionally, then United States Trade Rep-
resentative-designate Charlene Barshefsky expressed concerns regarding the im-
pact on the WTO's reputation if it were to challenge a national security-motivated
law: the United States must "prevent the WTO from undermining its own credi-
bility by reaching a decision on a non-trade matter that purports to circumscribe
our ability to adopt policies essential to our national security." Id. The European-
American Chamber of Commerce, however, warned that if the American position
prevailed, it would set a broad precedent. See id
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Iran's and Libya's support of terrorism and pursuit of weapons of
mass destruction "endanger[s] the national security and foreign pol-
icy interests of the United States."'" The statutory language resolves
any question of ambiguity regarding intent. While few would argue
that terrorism does not pose a threat to national security, there is a
lack of consensus regarding ILSA's means of trying to stop terror-
ism. The American method punishes those foreign companies who
invest in Iran and Libya and the ensuing dropoff in investment will
decrease the countries' streams of revenue and their abilities to sup-
port terrorism.147 ILSA imposes sanctions on foreign companies, but
those entities do not constitute the national security threat' 4 None-
theless, this indirect causal relationship probably could withstand
scrutiny, given the flexible nature of the national security exception
discussed above.
149
3. American Implementation of GATT and WTO Obligations
Despite its unrivaled political and economic might, the United
States was a primary proponent of the establishment of the WTO. In
fact, American negotiators pushed the idea of "fast track" ratifica-
tion, whereby countries-perhaps most importantly, the United
States Congress-are compelled to accept or reject the agreement
without any amendment. 5 ° The United States felt it was vital to be at
the forefront of the creation of the WTO to ensure that the American
imprint would be deep.' The United States, however, was by no
146. See ILSA, supra note 3, §§ 2(1), (4).
147. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale be-
hind ILSA).
148. Nothing in the language of Article XXI of GATT requires a specific rela-
tionship between the security interest and the action taken to protect it. See GATT,
supra note 121, Art. XXI.
149. See supra notes 137-143 and accompanying text (detailing the national se-
curity exception).
150. See FRANK W. SWACKER ET AL., WORLD TRADE WITHOUT BARRIERS: THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (VTO) AND DIsPuTE RESOLUTION 109 (1995 &
Supp. 1996) Congress reviewed GATT 1994 in a special session in December
1994. See id There were some lawmakers and lobbyists who wanted to wait until
the new Republican Congress was seated so that Congress could analyze and
amend the Agreement "to protect the interests of the United States." See id GATT
1994 has the explicit approval of Congress, something the original GATT did not.
See Vernon, supra note 131, at 338.
151. See generally Vernon, supra note 131, at 333-34 (noting the influence of
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means willing to give up any power or sovereignty for the success of
the WTO. 15 2 As such, §102(a) of the WTO implementing legislation
states that "[n]o provision of any of the Uruguay Round agreements,
nor the application of any such provision to any person or circum-
stance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall
have effect." '53 There are no indications that restriction is not meant
to be prospective as well as reflective.'54 It is therefore legitimate, in
terms of domestic law, to pass an act that is potentially inconsistent
with GATT.
the national interests of key countries, such as the United States, Japan and those in
the European Union on the elements of the WTO); see also David Palmeter, Inter-
national Trade Law in the Twenty-First Century, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1653,
1654 (1995) (observing that the "rules of the WTO clearly reflect the views of its
lions, particularly the United States and the European Union").
152. See The Uruguay Round Agreements Act Statement of Administrative Ac-
tion, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, H.R. REP. No. 103-
316, at 656, 659 (1994) (stating that the United States must agree to any changes
in its substantive rights and obligations).
153. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(1994) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3501) [hereinafter Uruguay Round Agree-
ments Act]; cf Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 308, 61 Stat. pts 5, 6 (requiring
contracting parties to accept Part II of GATT 1947, which contains most of the
substantive obligations of GATT, including those concerning customs procedures,
quotas, subsidies, anti-dumping duties and national treatment, to the extent they do
not contradict existing domestic legislation). The Protocol's language essentially
allowed the Contracting Parties to exempt themselves from some of GATT's cen-
tral provisions. See LOWENFELD, supra note 127, at 24. Despite the statutory as-
surance of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, some people worried about a loss
of American sovereignty. During the 1996 Presidential campaign, Republican
candidate and former Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole changed his position on
the WTO. See Stuart Anderson, Dole: A Leaf from Buchanan's Book, J. COM.,
Oct. 4, 1996, at 7A. Ironically, Dole played a crucial role in the congressional ap-
proval of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. See id. After
Congress approved the WTO, however, Dole introduced a bill that would establish
a commission to review WTO panel reports to determine whether the WTO had
exceeded its authority and if it had, whether it could recommend that the United
States withdraw from the WTO. See Dispute Settlement Review Commission Act,
S. 16, 104' Cong. (1995). Criticizing President Clinton's trade policy as a "disas-
ter" during the campaign, Dole pledged that his administration would "not let our
national sovereignty be infringed by the World Trade Organization or any other
international body." See Anderson, supra at 7A.
154. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, supra note 153.
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4. The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism
The dispute settlement mechanism in the WTO will not necessar-
ily serve to restrict United States policy either. Under the previous
GATT structure, a contracting party could prevent the establishment
of a panel to resolve disputes, thereby protecting its prerogative to
follow its own policy.' Under the new WTO rules, however, a
member cannot "block" the establishment of a dispute settlement
panel or the adoption of a panel report) 56 Practically speaking,
though, this new development does not pose a threat to any mem-
ber's laws. If a panel were to make a finding contrary to the United
States, for example, the decision is not self-executing--it does not
automatically become part of American law. 57 The losing party can
choose to bring the offending law into compliance with its obliga-
tions under the WTO. Alternatively, other WTO members can
choose to ask for compensation or retaliate against the offending
party if it does not cease its offensive behavior.' Regardless of its
obligations in the WTO, the United States ultimately controls its own
destiny.
5. The United States Is Not Violating Its Free Trade Obligations
American trading partners found themselves outraged by conduct
155. See SWACKER ET AL., supra note 150, at 153; see also Jackson, supra note
130, at 158 (analyzing the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism after its first
eighteen months in existence).
156. See Jackson, supra note 130, at 158. A panel will be established automati-
cally if a member requests it. In addition, a panel report will be adopted unless
there is a consensus against it. See id
157. See Schott, supra note 130, at 6; see also John H. Jackson, The WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obli-
gations, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 63-64 (1997) (arguing that although a panel report
may not be binding in the United States in a "statute like" sense, it is binding in
the "traditional international law sense" and thus should significantly affect do-
mestic U.S. jurisprudence).
158. See Schott, supra note 130, at 6. Authors disagree as to whether compli-
ance is really "voluntary." Compare Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding: Less is More, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 416, 417 (1996) (arguing
that the WTO relies on voluntary compliance); with Jackson, supra note 157, at
60-61 (responding to and disagreeing with Bello's conclusion). Jackson argues that
an adopted report establishes an international law obligation upon the losing party
nation to change its law to conform to WTO rules. See Jackson, supra note 157, at
60-61.
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that seemingly ran counter to universally accepted principles of free
trade.'59 Moreover, ILSA puzzles other countries because it incorpo-
rates a position contrary to what has been the American position with
regard to trade and investment in the Third World.6 ° Furthermore,
opponents of United States trade policy in general view ILSA and
Helms-Burton as evidence that the United States is negotiating in bad
faith.
16'
Despite those charges, ILSA does not violate the United States'
free trade obligations. That does not mean, however, that the Euro-
pean Union does not have a basis for a challenge; in the WTO
framework, such "violations" are not necessary to request adjudica-
tion. 62 In fact, a member state must only show that the conduct in
question has nullified or impaired the benefits of one's rights and
obligations as a member of the WTO. 163 Since the United States has
159. See Welch Statement, supra note 72, at 11 (noting that Canada, Europe,
and Japan believe that sanctions unilaterally imposed by the United States will
violate internationally recognized principles of free trade); see also Hillman
Statement, supra note 80, at 17 (testifying that United States trading partners be-
lieve ILSA is inconsistent with the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the WTO Agreement). While testifying on behalf of the United
States Trade Representative, Ambassador Hillman expressed some concern re-
garding the impact ILSA would have on the multilateral trading system. See id,
She further testified, however, that "in cases where we have not been able to ob-
tain sufficient multilateral action, but where our national security and economic
interests are at risk, we need to look at alternatives." Id Therefore, a balance
needs to be forged, weighing the various interests and impacts. See id.
160. See European Union May Not File WTO Case Against United States Over
Cuba, Aide Says, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 560 (Apr. 3, 1996) (quoting the
comments of Hugo Paemen, the European Union Ambassador to the United States,
regarding Helms-Burton). His comments are applicable to ILSA as well: "It does
indeed seem strange that a country which is pressing for strong international rules
on the facilitation and protection of investments in third countries ... at the same
times removes legal certainty vis-a-vis its major trading partners who may have
invested in the United States and in the 'critical' country concerned."Id. Further,
Paemen questioned the use of unilateral sanctions in the current trading system,
noting that while such sanctions may be justified in times of large-scale war, they
are not appropriate in the current global trade structure. See id
161. See Schwenniger, supra note 112, at 23 (noting that support of dubious
trade sanctions has undermined some essential U.S. trade actions). If the United
States negotiates agreements with which it never intends to comply, it could be
viewed as negotiating in bad faith.
162. See Schott, supra note 130, at 9. Specific violations are not necessary in
terms of requesting a WTO panel.
163. See id.
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not levied any sanctions to date, the European Union is unable to
claim specific instances of concrete injuries or damages." The
European Union could argue that ILSA has impaired its member
states' rights because it decreases the incentives to invest in Iran and
Libya. 6 5 Although ILSA may have a negative impact on a WTO
member by nullifying or impairing its benefits, it does not necessar-
ily follow that the United States is violating its WTO obligations.
66
A nullification or impairment does not equal a violation.' 67 Further-
more, a member state's obligations are waived if the measure is taken
pursuant to a national security concern. 61 If an obligation is waived,
there is no violation. The United States may be violating the spirit of
its obligations, but it is justified and permitted to do so by the very
rules of the organization.
B. THE EUROPEANS REFUSE TO SUPPORT ILSA
America's trading partners voiced their opposition to ILSA prior
to its enactment.'69 Once President Clinton signed the legislation, the
European Union announced that it had no intention of supporting the
bill, and in fact took steps to see that no one under its aegis would
follow the law 70 Subsequently, the European Union passed a regu-
lation intended to block American sanctions legislation, specifically
Helms-Burton and ILSA, enacted by the United States in 1996.'17
164. See discussion infra notes 118-24. The State Department has not issued
sanctions against any foreign corporation for violating ILSA; therefore, quantifi-
able damages are impossible to calculate.
165. See ILSA, supra note 3, § 6 (outlining the sanctions that will be imposed
on those companies that invest in Iran or Libya).
166. See id Nonviolation nullification and impairment cases are rare. See id A
nonviolation nullification and impairment finding "does not require that a country
modify its practices, since it did not violate WTO obligations, but the country
should offer compensation." Id
167. See id.
168. See supra notes 137-143 and accompanying text (discussing the national
security exception).
169. See United States Legislation on Iran, Libya Would Violate WTO Rules,
EU Says, supra note 122, at 219; see also United States Urges Congress to Rework
Bill to Punish Foreign Firms in Iran, Libya, supra note 112, at 903 (describing the
European Union's concerns regarding the proposal for ILSA).
170. See John K Schmertz, Jr. & Mike Meier, Economic Sanctions, 3 INT'L L.
UPDATE 1 (1997) (detailing the action taken by the European Union against
ILSA).
171. See id (quoting Article 4 of the European Union Council regulation). The
1997] 425
AM. U. INT' L. REV.
The regulation states that "[n]o judgment of a court or tribunal and
no decision of an administrative authority located outside the Com-
munity giving effect ... to [Helms-Burton and ILSA] ... shall be
recognized or be enforceable in any manner." '72 The European Union
also instituted a dispute resolution tribunal within the WTO to hear
complaints regarding Helms-Burton.' No such panel was set up for
ILSA. 17 4 In April 1997, however, the United States and the European
Union achieved a settlement suspending the WTO panel for six
months to allow for negotiations.' Although not the primary focus
of the settlement, the agreement did implicate ILSA.17 The Memo-
randum of Understanding stated that any action on the part of the
United States taken against a European company or individual for a
violation of ILSA could destroy the compromise. 177 The Clinton
regulation also provided that a European Union person or entity damaged by the
American statutes can recover through litigation. See id. (describing Article 6).
172. Id.
173. See id. According to the European Union complaint filed with the WTO,
Helms-Burton violated articles I, III, V, XI, and XIII of GATT as well as General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) articles I, III, VI, XVI, and XVII. See
Schmertz & Meier, supra note 170.
174. Seeid.
175. See United States and European Union Reach 11th Hour Agreement to
Avoid WTO Hearing on Validity of the HBA, BOYcOTr L. BULL., Apr. 14, 1997, at
1. In exchange for suspending the WTO panel, President Clinton promised to urge
Congress to amend Helms-Burton to allow the President to permanently waive the
provision prohibiting executives of companies that invest in or own confiscated
property in Cuba from entering the United States. See United States, European
Union Approve Plan to Resolve Dispute Over Helms-Burton, Officials Say, 14
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 686 (Apr. 16, 1997). Despite the temporary agreement,
Stuart Eizenstat, Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade, said that
the United States would still enforce the law. See id.
176. See Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the U.S. Helms-Burton
Act and the U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 36 I.L.M. 529 (1997) [hereinafter
Memorandum of Understanding] (setting forth the agreement between the Euro-
pean Union and the United States to: (1) suspend the WTO panel regarding Helms-
Burton in return for the suspension of enforcement of Title III of the law and the
President's promise to seek the authority to grant waivers of enforcement of Title
IV; and (2) work toward granting waivers under ILSA for European Union mem-
ber states investing in Iran and Libya).
177. See id. (stating that "[t]he EU reserves all rights to resume the panel proce-
dure, or begin new proceedings, if action is taken against EU companies or indi-
viduals under Title III or Title IV of the Libertad Act or if the waivers under ILSA
referred to above are not granted or are withdrawn"); see also European Union
Suspends Effort to Challenge in WTO Helms-Burton Legislation, 14 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 742 (Apr. 23, 1997) (noting that further action taken against European
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Administration, however, did not promise that it would extend waiv-
ers to European Union member states regarding the application of
ILSA, although it did indicate that it would consider doing so.'
After the six-month hiatus, the United States and European Union re-
sumed settlement negotiations regarding Helms-Burton and ILSA,
but did not come to any definitive resolution.'79
While the United States has endeavored to pursue a policy of eco-
nomic coercion against Iran and Libya, the European Union has pre-
ferred the "critical dialogue" approach.""0 The European Union pol-
icy, which seeks to dissuade Iran from its rogue activities through
discussion and continued trade deals, repudiates the American tactic
of economic pressure and isolation."' This approach, however, was
Union companies or individuals under Helms-Burton or ILSA could result in a re-
quest to restart the WTO panel or begin new proceedings).
178. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 176; see also United
States Launches New Effort to Convince European Union to Tighten Sanctions
Against Iran, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 749 (Apr. 23, 1997) (stating that the
agreement provides no assurances to the European Union that any waivers would
be extended); see also United States, European Union Approve Plan to Resolve
Dispute Over Helms-Burton, Officials Say, supra note 175, at 686 (finding that an
agreement on definite commitments will require consultations with Congress, in
addition to the efforts made by negotiations); Two Week Old Truce Between
United States and European Union over HBA and ILSA Beginning to Unravel,
BOYcoTr L. BULL., Apr. 28, 1997, at I (offering that the President may invoke a
waiver only upon a showing of "substantial economic sanctions" against Iran by
European Union countries).
179. See US.-EU Helms-Burton Dispute Resolution Unlikely Before December,
Official Says, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1834 (Oct. 22, 1997) (reporting that
negotiators did not create a new deadline even though the two sides did not settle
the issue).
180. See European Union Suspends 'Critical Dialogue' With Iran: Ending Ties
is Weighed, Dutch Offlcial Says, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 706 (Apr. 16, 1997)
(reporting the European Union suspension of the critical dialogue with Iran). The
European Union Council instituted the critical dialogue approach in December
1992, in an attempt to establish a constructive relationship with Iran. See id.
181. See European Union's Decision to End its "Critical Dialogue" with Iran
Cuts No Ice in Halls of Congress, BoYCoT L. BULL., May 12, 1997, at 3 (stating
that the United States does not believe that constructive engagement will work
with Iran completely and that the only way to force Iran to change its policies is to
isolate Iran from the world community); see also Iran and Proliferation: Hearings
on Before the Subcomm. on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong., (1997) available in LEXIS, Legis Li-
brary, Cngtst File (statement of Senator Alphonse D'Amato) [hereinafter D'Amato
Statement] (commenting that despite its criticism of the American efforts, Europe-
ans could not offer any evidence that its dialogue with Iran has lessened terrorism);
1997] 427
AM. U INTL L. REv.
irreparably damaged, if not destroyed, in April 1997 when a German
court ruled that high-ranking Iranian officials were involved in the
assassination of Kurdish political opposition leaders.'82 As a result,
the European Union declared that it could no longer continue the
critical dialogue with Iran if it "disrespected international norms and
engaged in terrorist activities."' 3 Although the United States sought
to take advantage of the Europeans' potential change of heart,"&I the
European Union refused to adopt economic sanctions against Iran."8 5
In light of the European Union's recent criticism of the United States
and the latter's blatant attempts to force its own policies on other na-
tions, the European Union declined to change its approach and fol-
low the American lead. 186
III. ILSA IS INEFFECTIVE
A. FOREIGN COMPANIES ARE STILL INVESTING IN IRAN AND
LIBYA
Although less than two years has passed since ILSA's approval,
cf Jahangir Amuzegar, Adjusting to Sanctions, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 31, 37 n.3.
(1997) (noting that, ironically, critical dialogue is essentially what the Clinton ad-
ministration is proposing vis-a-vis China as well as the linkage between MFN
status and human rights abuses).
182. See European Union Suspends 'Critical Dialogue' With Iran: Ending Ties
is Weighed, Dutch Official Says, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 706 (Apr. 16, 1997)
(reporting the European Union suspension of the critical dialogue with Iran). Al-
though the European Union originally recommended that its member states sever
diplomatic ties with Iran, the Council of Ministers allowed the return of its ambas-
sadors to Tehran. See European Union Ignores U.S. Request to Take Economic
MeasuresAgainst Iran, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. 787 (Apr. 30, 1987).
183. See European Union Suspends 'Critical Dialogue' With Iran, supra note
182, at 706.
184. See United States Launches New Effort, supra note 178, at 749 (quoting
State Department spokesman Nicholas Bums as saying, in light of the European
Union reaction to the German court's determination, "we're certain now we have a
window of opportunity to consult with [the European Union] on a friendly basis
about our view of Iran's behavior, and about what we think is the best way for-
ward").
185. See European Union Ignores United States Request to Take Economic
Measures Against Iran, supra note 182, at 787.
186. See supra notes 112-117 and accompanying text (detailing claims of un-
warranted unilateralism).
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preliminary results indicate that the law is not working.'" The law
seeks to alter Iran's and Libya's conduct by choking off their revenue
streams, but the nations' behavior has not changed, at least not to the
extent hoped for by the law's sponsors.'" In fact, many countries are
blatantly ignoring the American law and several companies have fi-
nalized deals with Iran.' The most glaring example of this defiance
is the $2 billion partnership to develop Iran's South Pars offshore
natural gas field announced in September 1997.' 9o The partnership
includes Total, S.A., a French oil company, Petronas, the Malaysian
state oil venture and Gazprom, a large Russian oil company."9 Fur-
187. See generally Amuzegar, supra note 181 (discussing the reasons for the
general ineffectiveness of the American scheme of sanctions and concluding that
while economic pressure has hurt the Iranian economy, it has not produced the an-
ticipated results nor transformed the Islamic regime). But see D'Amato Statement,
supra note 181 (testifying that ILSA is effective: "Even a senior member of the
Iranian Parliament was quoted in January as saying the sanctions are working.
There is little or no foreign investment in the Iranian petroleum industry."); State
Dept. Is Focusing on Eleven Iranian Oil and Gas Developments Under ILSA,
BoycoTr L. BULL., Feb. 24, 1997, at 3 (quoting Sen. D'Amato's conclusion that
ILSA is effective since Royal Dutch Shell announced it would not proceed with an
Iranian project for fear of American repercussions).
188. See id
189. See id at 36 (finding that many countries ignored the United States' re-
quest for trade sanctions)..
190. See Charles Fleming & Bhushan Babree, France's Total Dismisses U.S.
Sanctions Law, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1997, at A16; see also Jareer Elass, Peg
Mackey and Jonathan Bearman, D'Amato Aide Raises Possibility of New Lav to
Address Petronas Stake in Iranian Fields, OIL DAILY, Oct. 30, 1996, at 1 (de-
scribing French investments in Iran's offshore oil fields and citing the activity as
"clearly sanctionable").
191. See Fleming & Bahree, supra note 190, at A16 (noting that each com-
pany's government supports the deal). The inclusion of Gazprom in the venture
particularly upsets ILSA's congressional proponents. See Iran Libya Sanctions
Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs,
105th Cong. (1997) available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File (statement of
Senator Sam Brownback) [hereinafter Brownback Statement]. In order to finance
its participation in the deal, Gazprom (which is partly owned by the Russian gov-
ernment) planned a bond offering that Goldman Sachs, a Wall Street investment
bank, would underwrite. See Steven Erlanger, Russian Partner in Iran Deal Post-
pones Its Bond Offering, N.Y. TIUES, November 12, 1997, at A1O. The Russian
company, however, delayed its offering due to apparent pressure from the United
States government. See id. In addition, back in 1994, the Export-Import Bank
agreed to provide up to $750 million in loan guarantees to Gazprom for Russial oil
and gas projects. See Brownback Statement, supra; see also Iran Libya Sanctions
Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs,
105th Cong. (1997) available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File (statement of
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ther, Turkey, a key NATO ally in the Middle East, signed two deals
with Iran, including a $20 billion, twenty-three year gas supply deal
that was finalized soon after the United States implemented ILSA.1
92
While foreign companies are openly pursuing deals, the State De-
partment's ILSA enforcement unit is not hunting down those viola-
tors.'93 Rather, it appears to be on the lookout for problematic proj-
ects and evaluating them for terms that violate ILSA.' 94 In that
regard, the State Department hopes to avert a scenario wherein it is
forced to levy sanctions.' 95 Most recently, the Clinton Administration
Senator Alfonse D'Amato). The Senators were angered to find that American tax-
payers would be indirectly subsidizing Iran in developing its energy sector. See
Brownback Statement, supra; see also Iran Libya Sanctions Act: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. (1997)
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File (statement of Senator Mitch
McConnell) [hereinafter McConnell Statement]. In response, Senator McConnell
proposed report language to the foreign operations bill calling upon the Export-
Import Bank to suspend all Gazprom transactions. See McConnell Statement, su-
pra; see also Nick Halliwell & Kimberley Music, Gazprom Loan Puts Ex-Im Bank
in Hot Seat, OIL DAILY, Oct. 27, 1997, at 1.
192. See Jareer Elass, Sanctions Office Faces Complex Task as Myanmar Joins
Targeted Nations, OIL DAILY, May 22, 1997, at 3; see also 12 Foreign Firms, su-
pra note 86, at 2 (reporting that although the projects appear to be violations of
ILSA, the State Department has not pursued the investors, using the rationalization
that "a project on its face may appear to be an obvious violation [of ILSA], but we
want to be sure that ILSA is applied correctly").
193. See Elass, supra note 192, at 3 (noting that the State Department seems to
be seeking out potentially violative projects before the deals are consummated so
that it will not have to take the next step of imposing sanctions). At least eleven
projects received attention from the State Department: the South Pars Gasfield De-
velopment; AMAK Gas Processing Facility; Daroud Oilfield Expansion Project;
Salman Field Khuff Gas Reservior; Bandar Abbas Condensate Refinery; Shraz Re-
finery Expansion; the NGL-1200 Facility; the NGL-1300 Facility; Lavan Island
LPG Facility; Balal Oilfield Development Project; and Soroush Oilfield Develop-
ment Project. See also State Dept. Is Focusing on Eleven Iranian Oil and Gas De-
velopments Under ILSA, supra note 187, at 3.
194. See 12 Foreign Firms, supra note 86, at 2. The State Department's ILSA
Unit consults with foreign governments and contacts international firms to inform
them about the risks of investment deals that could trigger sanctions. See The Iran
and Libya Sanctions Act After One Year: Hearing Before the House Comm. on
Int'7 Relations, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Alan P. Larson, Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Economic and Business Affairs) (testifying on the implementation
and enforcement of ILSA).
195. See 12 Foreign Firms, supra note 86, at 1. Some European officials have
reported that American policymakers have indicated to them that the State De-
partment is looking for excuses to extend waivers to the foreign companies that
have initiated deals with Iran. See Steven Erlanger, Standoff with Iraq: the Strat-
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tacitly approved a $1.6 billion Turkmenistan-to-Turkey natural gas
pipeline project.16 An official stated that the Administration does not
endorse the project but offered that the pipeline "technically" does
not violate ILSA." 197 The postponement of Gazprom's Wall Street
bond offering is the one tangible "success" the United States can
claim.198 The State Department's lack of enthusiasm for enforcement
thus heightens the level of ineffectiveness. That should not, however,
overshadow the fact that the United States is not sanctioning viola-
tors of ELSA.
Since companies continue to do business in Iran and Libya, it ap-
pears that ILSA has not devastated either country's economy. Iran
has not acquiesced under the weight of the United States' primary or
secondary boycotts. 9 9 Iran's pre-revolutionary Minister of Finance,
Jahangir Amuzegar, argues that even under sanctions, Iran's econ-
omy is healthier and more stable than some economies to whom the
United States does provide assistance."' That is not to say that the
Iranian economy has not suffered,2' but Iran still meets its quota set
egy, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 11, 1997, at A10 (reporting that Undersecretary of State for
Economic Affairs Stuart Eizenstat countered with the assertion that sanctions are a
"very real, live option" if the State Department's investigation concludes that the
conduct violates ILSA).
196. See Dan Morgan & David B. Ottaway, US. Won't Bar Pipeline Across
Iran, WASH. POST, July 27, 1997, at Al (reporting that the Clinton Administration
chose not to oppose a natural gas pipeline, marking the "first significant easing of
the economic isolation of the Tehran regime").
197. See id
198. See Erlanger, supra note 191, at A 10 (reporting that Gazprom may have
postponed the bond offering due to pressure from the Clinton Administration).
199. See generally Amuzegar, supra note 181 (concluding the sanctions have
not brought about the intended results, although admitting that there is not enough
hard data for a complete analysis). See also Zbigniew Brzezinski et al., Differenti-
ated Containment, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1997, at 20 [hereinafter Differentiated
Containment] (criticizing the United States' current "dual containment" policy
toward Iran and Iraq). The authors, three foreign policy experts, one from each of
the previous three Administrations, criticize the policy of isolating Iran as a "crude
and counterproductive attempt to cordon off an entire country." Id at 20-21. Fur-
thermore, it is forcing the Persian Gulf nations into closer relations with Russia
and is driving wedges between the United States and its Group of Seven allies. See
id The authors conclude that the sanctions have been ineffectual and "the attempt
to coerce others into following America's lead has been a mistake." See id at 28.
Instead, the former advisors advocate a "nuanced" containment that would include
diplomatic contacts and flexibility in relations. See id at 29-30.
200. See Amuzegar, supra note 181, at 3 1.
201. See id at 32 (listing various "difficulties" in the Iranian economy, such as
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by OPEC, and daily crude production, oil export receipts, and net
foreign assets were higher in 1996-97 than they were in 1993-94.'0'
Moreover, although he concedes American pressure has had an im-
pact on Iran, Richard Murphy, an Assistant Secretary of State in the
Reagan Administration, asserts that Iran's problems are due, in large
part, to its own corruption and mismanagement." 3
The picture of post-ILSA Libya is not as clear. Statistics regarding
possible difficulties in Libya are negligible, perhaps because multi-
lateral sanctions have already existed against it for over five years.
0 4
As a result, there is no direct before-and-after comparison with re-
gard to ILSA. Nonetheless, the sparse data indicates that although
both United States and United Nations sanctions slowed Libyan pe-
troleum development, Libya still manages to meet its 1.39 million
barrels per day quota set by OPEC." 5 Furthermore, the Libyan econ-
the delay or cancellation of normal credits from international financial organiza-
tions, the postponement of scheduled long-term foreign loans, and the withholding
of foreign technical assistance in some areas).
202. See id. at 32 (demonstrating that sanctions, which were expected to signifi-
cantly damage the Iranian economy, have had a suprisingly small effect); see also
The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996: Results to Date: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 105th Cong. (1997) available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, Cngtst File (statement of Jeffrey J. Schott, Senior Fellow, Institute for In-
ternational Economics) (testifying that Iranian oil revenues grew at a rate of 3.5 to
4 percent in the last two years despite American sanctions).
203. See Richard W. Murphy, It's Time to Reconsider the Shunning of Iran,
WASH. POST, July 20, 1997, at Cl (arguing for a new dialogue with the newly-
elected regime in Iran). The author suggests that the United States should propose
talks at the level of deputy secretary or undersecretary of state, which "would put
our exchanges on a new footing, granting the Islamic regime a legitimacy we have
withheld until now." Id. In advocating a dialogue with Iran, the United States, as
the dominant power in the region, "can afford to add the legitimizing carrot of ne-
gotiation to the punitive stick of sanctions." Id.
204. See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text (discussing the United Na-
tions sanctions against Libya); see also The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act After
One Year: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Intl Relations, 105th Cong.
(1997) available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File (statement of C. David
Welch, Acting Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs) (testifying that it is too
early to evaluate the impact of ILSA on "would-be violators of the U.N. sanctions
in place against Libya").
205. See The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act: One Year Later: Hearing Before the
House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 105th Cong. (1997) available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, Cngtst File (statement of Sarah Miller, Editor-in-Chief, Petroleum Intelli-
gence Weekly) [hereinafter Miller Statement] (testifying that despite sanctions,
Libya's oil production capacity has been sustained by several ongoing projects,
such as the development at the Murzuk field).
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omy has long been open to foreign companies and, therefore, there is
less need for new development and investment.26 Plus, the petro-
leum development contracts already existing at the time of ILSA's
enactment are not subject to sanctions.2"7 In reality, American poli-
cymakers appear to be less concerned with the conduct of Libya; the
on-going debate regarding sanctions and ILSA centers on Iran.
B. UNITED STATES POLICY IS INCONSISTENT
The lack of consistency in United States foreign policy throughout
the region leaves its trading partners with little to guide their ovn
policies. This erratic behavior damages America's credibility and is
in some ways responsible for the United States allies' lack of sup-
port.0 ' Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger attributes the ab-
sence of consensus regarding sanctions against Iran and Libya to the
perception that the Clinton Administration is acting as if it is embar-
rassed by ILSA.0 9 Kissinger argues further that the Europeans may
question the seriousness of the policy and "fear being left in the
lurch" if a crisis develops.10 As a result, this current round of sanc-
206. See Welch Statement, supra note 72. In contrast, the Iranian economy has
been closed off to Westerners. See id Miller testified that only two companies
have announced new deals in Libya, but added that these investments would
probably not reach the threshold amount for sanctions for some years. See Miller
Statement. supra note 205. Another reason for the lack of statistics is the fact that
Libya never really was the focus of the various generations of the legislation. See
discussion supra note 78.
207. See ILSA, supra note 3, § 13(a); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11), su-
pra note 71, at 20.
208. See Amuzegar, supra note 181, at 36-37 (arguing that United States sanc-
tions have been "selective and arbitrary in their targets, and the United States has
frequently breached the policy when it suited its interests"). For example, Syria is
on the list of "terrorist states" along with Iran, but high-ranking United States of-
ficials engage in negotiations with Syria. See id Further, North Korea is pursuing
weapons of mass destruction in a manner similar to Iran, but North Korea is al-
lowed to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy, whereas Iran is not. See id
Moreover, the United States vehemently opposed the Arab League's boycott of
Israel and now it has instituted a boycott of its own that is oft compared with that
of the Arabs. See id
209. See Henry Kissinger, The Oil Deal With Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1997,
at A20 (arguing that the United States should replace the sanctions with diplomatic
engagement).
210. Id. (conjecturing that American allies may perceive ILSA as an election-
year response to domestic pressures rather than a well-reasoned policy).
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tions has isolated Washington more so than Tehran."l' Other nations
feel uncomfortable making commitments at the request of the United
States when the United States may change its mind soon thereafter."'
This is especially the case since although the United States has called
upon the world to isolate and punish Iran, Americans have continued
to deal with the Iranians.2 3 This double dealing is nothing new, how-
ever. The most glaring evidence of this "opportunism" is the secret
arms deal behind the Reagan Administration's Iran-Contra affair."4
In addition, despite the ban on Iranian oil imports imposed in the
1980s, American oil companies accounted for one-third of Iran's oil
exports and the United States had become Iran's fourth-largest trad-
ing partner.1 5 More recently, in another clandestine operation, Presi-
dent Clinton allowed Iran to send munitions to Bosnia.2"6
C. MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE MORE EFFECTIVE
Sanctions are most likely to be successful when they are "univer-
sal and comprehensive, consistent, and credible." 1 7 According to a
study by the Institute for International Economics, unilateral Ameri-
can sanctions have been successful only in thirteen percent of the
cases in which they have been imposed since 1970.2"8 On the other
211. See Amuzegar, supra note 181, at 31 (noting that under sanctions, the Ira-
nian military appears stronger and more stable than it did in 1989); see also Differ-
entiated Containment, supra note 199, at 24 (stating that United States' sanctions
have somewhat damaged the Iranian economy, but have failed to result in "major
achievements and increasingly isolate America rather than their target"); Erlanger,
supra note 195, at A10 (quoting a senior European diplomat's conclusion that the
United States should revamp its Iran policy because the United States is "isolating
itself more successfully than it is isolating Iran").
212. See Kissinger, supra note 209, at A20 (discussing the lack of support from
other nations).
213. See Vahe Petrossian, United States Escalates War of Words Against Iran,
MIDDLE EAST ECON. DIG., Aug. 30, 1996, at 2 (noting that despite a ban on Ira-
nian oil imports, United States oil companies handled one third of Iran's oil ex-
ports in 1993 and 1994).
214. See Amuzegar, supra note 181, at 37 (noting several of the United States'
repeated departures from stated principles).
215. See id.
216. See id. (describing the arms shipments to Bosnia as another flagrant exam-
ple of the United States' inconsistency).
217. Id. at 35. The author notes that the United States containment policy has
been unsuccessful because none of the conditions were met. See id.
218. See The Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions: Hearing Before
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hand, there are current examples of where multilateral sanctions have
pressured regimes into changing their conduct; for instance, sanc-
tions played a significant role in the end of apartheid in South Africa
and the cessation of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia.2 9 The na-
ture of the prohibited activity in ILSA-the investment practices of
foreign corporations-makes the law very difficult to enforce alone.
So if the United States does not garner the cooperation of its trading
partners willing to impose sanctions, the intended punishing impact
of ILSA will be muted. When the United States is the only party in-
stituting sanctions, it simply forces the targeted country to turn its
marketing strategies elsewhere." ° Furthermore, it is critical that those
who fashion American foreign policy recognize that unilateral sanc-
tions affect parties other than the country whose conduct is objec-
tionable and only produces ill will and friction if a majority of coun-
tries do not support the sanctions." '
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong.
(1997), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File (statement of Kimberly
Ann Elliott, Research Fellow, Institute for International Economics) (describing
the declining utility of unilateral sanctions as a tool of foreign policy). Sanctions
are most likely to work when: the goal is relatively modest; the target country is
smaller than the sanctioner; the sanctioner and target are friendly and conduct sub-
stantial trade; the sanctions are imposed quickly and decisively; and the sanctioner
avoids high costs to itself. See id
219. See The Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions: Hearing Before
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means., 105th Cong.
(1997), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File (statement of Representa-
tive Lee Hamilton) [hereinafter Hamilton Statement] (stating that the multilateral
sanctions against South Africa contributed to the end of apartheid); see also The
Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions: Hearing Before Subcomm. On
Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. (1997), available in
LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File (statement of Stuart Eizenstat, Undersecretary
of State for Economic Affairs) (theorizing that the combination of sanctions and
the threat of military reversals for the Bosnian Serbs forced Slobodan Milosevic to
the peace talks in Dayton, Ohio, in 1995).
220. See Amuzegar, supra note 181, at 36 (noting that American allies, includ-
ing Kuwait, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates have expanded their commer-
cial links with Iran); see also Little Impact Over Long Term, supra note 29, at
1739 (arguing that Iran has found "alternative suppliers" to take the place of
American companies); Hamilton Statement, supra note 219 (reasoning that unilat-
eral sanctions rarely work because the world economy is too interdependent).
221. See Differentiated Containment, supra note 199, at 28 (stating that only
multilateral policies toward Iran have the potential for success and sustainment);
see also Elaine Sciolino, Calling Iran 'Outlaw State' Christopher Defends US
Trade Ban, N.Y. TMiEs, May 2, 1995, at A6 (concluding that "[t]he United States
is so isolated in its anti-Iran campaign that it will not seek a United Nations reso-
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D. OPTIONS FOR UNITED STATES POLICY
The tacit approval of the Turkmenistan pipeline project highlights
the problems inherent in ILSA. Senator D'Amato and his colleagues
designed the law to frighten foreign companies away from doing
business in Iran and Libya. Faced with the choice of trading with the
United States, the world's economic superpower, or with Iran or
Libya, two Third World economies, Congress thought the choice
would be clear.222 As it turns out, though, some foreign corporations
are choosing the opposite conclusion. The element Congress did not
foresee, perhaps, is the Clinton Administration's lack of enforce-
ment. Thus, ILSA exists as a law vilified by the United States' trad-
ing partners, but lacking the support of the Administration whose
duty it is to execute it. Such an indifferent attitude does not eradicate
criticisms of inconsistency and capriciousness in American foreign
policy and certainly does not convince allies to expand unilateral
American sanctions into multilateral ones.
The United States, therefore, should choose one of three courses of
action. First, the State Department could take a harder position vis-a-
vis enforcement of ILSA. There are projects in existence that appear
to violate ILSA, but the State Department has not moved from the
investigation process to the imposition of sanctions. Judging by the
European Union's aversion to ILSA and the terms of the Memoran-
dum of Understanding,223 heightened enforcement would prompt a
WTO dispute settlement panel. As discussed above, an adverse deci-
sion would not alter ILSA, but could approve retaliatory measures or
call for compensation.2 4 If strictly enforced, ILSA may preclude any
easing of the tense relations with Iran, an option that might be a vi-
able one in light of the recent election which installed a relatively
moderate president. 25 Despite these drawbacks, the executive branch
lution for global economic sanctions").
222. See D'Amato Statement, supra note 181 (testifying that those countries
who trade or invest in Iran and Libya are "deal[ing] with the devil").
223. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 176 (discussing the terms
of a compromise between the United States and the European Union regarding
Helms-Burton and ILSA).
224. See supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text (detailing the conse-
quences of a WTO panel report).
225. See Thomas W. Lippman, New Iran Leader Provides Opportunity for
Change, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1997, at Al0.
[13:397436
UNILATERAL SANCTIONS WITH A TWIST
would fulfill its duty to enforce the nation's laws. Furthermore, strict
and consistent enforcement would give the United States' trading
partners a clearer indication of American policy.
Second, the situation can remain as it currently exists. ILSA, with
its strong message and consequences, is weakened by the Clinton
Administration's lax enforcement. The dichotomy between words
and actions leaves allies and trading partners with no real guiding in-
fluence, making it unlikely that allies will enact their own sanctions
against Iran and Libya or that foreign companies will be scared off
from investment and development deals. This bifurcation is not
unique to relations with Iran and Libya and many of the criticisms in
this particular circumstance are applicable to American foreign pol-
icy in general. Maintaining the status quo does nothing to quiet
those criticisms.
Third, Congress can repeal the law. It does not make sense to keep
a law on the books that is blatantly contrary to current policy. If the
present strategy of isolation proves ineffective, the United States
should repeal the law for the sake of appearances. If the United
States were to initiate formal contact and develop some sort of en-
gagement with Iran and Libya, forbidding others' contact with the
two regimes would be contradictory and illogical. Furthermore, if
Congress repeals ILSA and the United States decides to pursue a new
policy, American policymakers and negotiators will not be con-
strained by a law that the Administration will not enforce.
CONCLUSION
The passage of ILSA accomplished the domestic political goals of
American policymakers. Congress and President Clinton took steps
to quell the American people's fears about terrorism. Internationally,
however, the sanctions against foreign companies only invoked the
wrath of American trading partners-imposing one's foreign policy
on others never wins friends. The European Union resented the
American ultimatum to choose between trading with the United
States or with Iran and Libya. Despite the European Union's protests,
the United States' obligations pursuant to its membership in the
WTO do not prohibit the sanctions legislation. The obligations will
fail to do so as long as the exceptions to GATT and the WTO
Agreement dilute them. With the lack of support from the interna-
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tional community, and the Clinton Administration's lack of enforce-
ment, the American sanctions will not succeed to the degree that
ILSA's sponsors envisioned. Preliminary indications already point to
that result. The United States should either heighten its enforcement
activity or repeal the law. Either of those options would be contro-
versial, but implementing one of them would demonstrate decisive
action. Otherwise, if nothing is done, claims of chronic inconsistency
in American policy in the region will have a legitimate basis.
